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 few months ago, 25 of the 27 members of the European Union solemnly signed up to 
a  treaty  that  committed  them  to  putting  tough  deficits  limits  into  their  national 
constitutions. This so-called ‘fiscal compact’ was the key condition to get Germany to 
agree  to  increase  substantially  the  funding  for  the  eurozone’s  rescue  funds,  and  for  the 
European Central Bank to conduct its €1 trillion long-term refinancing operation (LTRO), 
which was essential to stabilising financial markets. 
Today, however, the eurozone’s attention has shifted to growth. This is a recurring pattern in 
European politics: austerity is proclaimed and defended as the pre-condition for growth, but 
then, when a recession bites, growth becomes the pre-condition for continued austerity. 
About 15 years ago, Europe endured a similar cycle. In the early 1990s, when the plans for 
European Monetary Union (EMU) were drawn up, Germany insisted on a ‘Stability Pact’ as a 
price for giving up the Deutsch mark. When Europe fell into a deep recession after 1995, 
attention shifted to growth, and the ‘Stability Pact’ became the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ 
(SGP) when the European Council adopted a Resolution on growth and employment in 1997. 
The need for growth is as strong today as it was 15 years ago. In Spain, the unemployment 
rate  then  was  as  high  as  it  is  now,  and  in  Italy  it  was  higher  in  1996  than  it  is  today. 
Politically,  too,  the  background  is  the  same:  the  “G”  was  inserted  into  the  SGP  under 
pressure primarily from a new French administration (at the time headed by Jacques Chirac). 
Today, France has again given the political impetus for a shift to growth. 
Making growth a political priority is uncontroversial (after all, who could be against it?). But 
the real question is: what can Europe do to create growth? The honest answer is: rather little. 
The key elements of a growth strategy discussed among Europe’s leaders these days are 
actually the same as in 1996-97: labour-market reforms, strengthening of the internal market, 
more funding for the European Investment Bank (EIB) for lending to small and medium-size 
enterprises  (SMEs)  and  more  resources  for  infrastructure  investment  in  poorer  member 
states.  The  last  two,  in  particular,  attract  a  lot  of  attention  because  they  involve  more 
spending. 
But circumstances are also quite different today. The EIB’s business model would have to be 
radically  changed  to  make  it  useful  to  promote  growth,  because  it  lends  only  against 
government  guarantees,  whereas  southern  Europe’s  fiscally  stressed  sovereigns  cannot 
afford further burdens. Moreover, contrary to a popular misconception, the EIB cannot lend 
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directly to SMEs. The EIB can only provide large banks with funding to lend to local SMEs. 
But the ECB is essentially already doing this with its three-year LTRO loans. 
There is also talk about a ‘Marshall Plan’ for southern Europe. Fifteen years ago, there was a 
clear need for better infrastructure there. But, since then, the southern countries have had a 
decade of rather high infrastructure investment – more than 3% of GDP in Spain, Greece, and 
Portugal. 
As  a  result,  most  countries  in  the  EU’s  south  probably  have  a  sufficient  stock  of 
infrastructure today. In fact, more infrastructure investment would actually make most sense 
in Germany, where infrastructure spending has been anaemic (only 1.6 % of GDP, or half the 
rate  of  Spain)  for  almost  a  decade  (see  Table  1).  In  fact,  that  is  why  Germany’s  famous 
Autobahnen are notoriously congested nowadays. 
Table 1. Public investment in selected EU countries (% of GDP) 
Country  Average 2000-07  2010  2011 
European Union (15 countries)  2.3  2.5  2.3 
Germany  1.5  1.6  1.7 
Greece  3.3  2.8  2.6 
Spain  3.6  3.8  2.7 
Sources: AMECO, DG Ecfin, European Commission.  
But one does not need European funding to finance infrastructure in Germany, where the 
government can raise funds at negative real cost. At the rates that it is paying today, the 
German government should be able to find many investment projects that yield a positive 
social rate of return. Given that Germany is close to full employment, more infrastructure 
spending  there  would  probably  suck  in  imports  (and  attract  unemployed  construction 
workers from Spain), contributing to much-needed rebalancing within the eurozone. 
Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen, because infrastructure spending runs up against 
popular opposition. Indeed, such spending is decided at the local and regional level, where 
grass-roots  opposition  to  any  large  project  is  strongest  (it  took  more  than  20  years,  for 
example, to push through the modernization of Stuttgart’s railway station). 
The urge to be seen to be ‘doing something’ is leading Europe’s policy-makers to rely on the 
few instruments with which the EU can claim to foster growth. But they should recognise 
that  today’s  growth  crisis  is  different.  The  real  bargain  should  not  be  austerity  plus  a 
Marshall Plan for the south, but rather continued austerity plus labour-market reforms in the 
south,  combined  with  more  infrastructure  investment  in  Germany  and  other  AAA-rated 
countries like the Netherlands. 
Deep  service-sector  reforms  in  Germany  would  also  help  to  unlock  the  country’s 
productivity potential and open its market to services exports from southern Europe. That 
way, the South would have a chance to find jobs for its rather well-educated young people, 
whose only choice now is between unemployment and emigration. 